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ADJUDICATION UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY
AMENDMENTS OF 1984: AN EXAMINATION
OF CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
TO THE NORTHERN PIPELINE DECISION.
John M. Evans */
Second Prize
1984 Law Student Essay Contest
Are recent criticisms of the 1984 Bankruptcy
Amendments unfair to Congress? In the
following essay, Mr. Evans examines the
issues raised by Northern Pipeline from the
viewpoint of the Congressional legal staff.
While article III, § 1, of the United States
Constitution states that judicial power of the United States
"shall" be vested in the Supreme Court and the inferior
courts, l/ historically Congress has opted not to vest all
judicial-power in the Federal courts. 2/ Congress has
*/ This essay was written while Mr. Evans was a 2nd-year
law student at Valparaiso University. The author
acknowledges the assistance of Professor Ivan E.
Bodensteiner in preparing the final draft for publication.
l/ Article III provides in pertinent part: "The Judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for
their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S.
CONST., art. III, § 1.
2/ As a matter of practical necessity, Congress, pursuant
to its power under the necessary and proper clause, U.S.(Footnote Continued)
delegated judicial fact-finding and decision-making in
numerous administrative agencies. 3/ These tribunals have
been known as legislative 4/ and administrative courts. 5/
(Footnote Continued)
Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 18, is empowered to establish
courts of special expertise with judges lacking life tenure.
See, Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407-08 (1973)
(article III requirements "must in proper circumstances give
way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress").
The notion of practical necessity also supports Congress'
power to establish administrative agencies to adjudicate
matters properly within the concern of Congress under its
article I, § 8 powers. In Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,
46 (1932), the Supreme Court declared that Congress may
authorize adjudication by agencies of matters "particularly
suited to examination and determination by administrative
agencies specifically assigned to that task". The
Constitution contains explicit, textual authority for the
judiciary to appoint non-article III judges as subordinate
officers. Article II, § 2, provides that "the Congress may
by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Court of Law,
or in the Heads of Departments." Pacemaker Diagnostic
Clinic of America v. Instromedix, 725 F.2d 537, 545 (9th
Cir. 1984); also see Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,
282 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1931) (commissioners are inferior
officers); Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 378 (1901) (Congress
may authorize judges to appoint commissioners).
3/ General procedures for rulemaking and adjudication are
set out in the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-59 (1976). See, e.q., Federal Communication Act, 47
U.S.C. § 303 (1976); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 47, 57(a) (1976); Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 156, 160 (1983); Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 655, 659 (1983).
4/ The Supreme Court enunciated the doctrine of
legislative courts in 1828, holding that a court created by
the Congress for the Florida Territory, whose judges did not
enjoy life tenure or undiminished protection, could
adjudicate an admiralty dispute--a case falling within the
purview of article III. That court was held to be
legitimately established under Congress' power to make "all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory
(Footnote Continued)
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In fact, legal scholars have observed that "as merely carbon
copies of the traditional article III courts, a lawyer
experienced in litigating cases in Federal courts would not
find an administrative or non-article III court strange or
unfamiliar". 6/
Until recently, the courts commonly upheld Con-
gressional delegation of adjudication to administrative
agencies. 7/ However, in 1982, the Supreme Court in Northern
Pipeline Co. v.. Marathon Pipeline Co. 8/ invalidated the
Congressional delegation of article III judicial power to
the bankruptcy courts. The decision created serious
(Footnote Continued)
belonging to the United States". American Ins. Co. v.
Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828). Congress has
created legislative courts to decide such particularized
federal questions as military discipline, 10 U.S.C. § 867
(1976); and taxation, 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1984).
5/ Adjudication is accorded a broad definition as an
agency process for formulation of an order, or the "final
disposition . . . (by) an agency in a matter other than
rulemaking". 5 U.S.C. 551(6)-(7) (1976). U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act (1947), gives the following definition:
" . . . adjudication is concerned with the determination of
past and present rights and liabilities. Normally . . . the
proceeding is characterized by an accursatory flavor and may
result in disciplinary action."
6/ See G. Robinson & E. Gellhorn, The Administrative
Process 29-30 (1974).
7/ See K. Davis, American Law Treatise, § 2.12 (Supp.
1970).
8/ 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Northern
Pipeline].
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problems for Congress, 9/ and Congressional response could
have ramifications beyond bankruptcy adjudication. 10/
To fully appreciate the impact of this decision on
adjudication under articles I and II of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, it must be viewed from the perspective of the Congres-
sional response. It is the thrust of this article to
examine the Congressional response II/ to the problems
raised in Northern Pipeline. Accordingly, this article
briefly examines federal bankruptcy adjudication and the
impact of the Northern Pipeline decision. The second
section will analyze the principal provisions of the bank-
ruptcy amendments. It will briefly sketch the various
article III and article I legislative proposals which were
the subject of Congressional debate. The analysis will show
that Congress recognized four separate propositions for
bankruptcy adjudication: judges are adjuncts under the
close supervision of an article III court; issues not
integral to core bankruptcy functions of restructuring
debtor-creditor rights must be decided by an article III
judge; parties must consent to have State lawsuits decided
by a bankruptcy judge; and, parties' right to a full and
automatic de novo review by an article III court. The third
section briefly analyzes the Constitutional considerations
of the statutory scheme and Congressional policy. The
impact of this analysis will be an appreciation of not only
the logic of current bankruptcy adjudication under article I,
but also an understanding of what has been called a
9/ The Northern Pipeline court held 1978 Bankruptcy Reform
Act, P.L. 95-598, § 241(a) unconstitutional; [hereinafter
referred to as the Act] and, the Court imposed a limited
stay to "afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the
bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid means of
adjudication . . ." 102 S. Ct. at 2880.
10/ For a discussion, see M. Redish, Legislative Courts,
Administrative Agencies and the "Northern Pipeline"
Decision, 1983 Duke L.J. 197-229 (1983).
11/ H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 Cong. Rec. H7471
(daily ed. June 29, 1984).
"frequently arcane" and "confusing" area of constitutional
law--article III courts. 12/
I. BANKRUPTCY ADJUDICATION
A. Overview of Statutory Development
The Founding Fathers gave Congress plenary juris-
diction over bankruptcy. 13/ Precipitated by periodic
financial crises and depressions, Congressional legislation
has historically carried the notion of a fresh start for
debtors and protection for creditors. 14/ In 1970,
12/ Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor in Northern Pipeline
concurring note: "Particularly in an area of constitutional
law such as that of 'Art. III Courts,' with its frequently
arcane distinctions and confusing precedents, rigorous
adherence to the principle that this Court should decide no
more of a constitutional question than is absolutely
necessary accords with both our decided cases and with sound
judicial policy." 102 S. Ct. at 2281.
13/ "The Congress shall have power . . . to establish
uniform laws on this subject of Bankruptcy." U.S. Const.,
art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
14/ The first American bankruptcy legislation on the
federal level was enacted in 1800. See Warren, Bankruptcy
in the United States History 12-19 (1935). It was modeled
after existing English bankruptcy legislation, proceeding
only for involuntary petition and applying primarily
commerical interests. Bankruptcy Act 1800, Ch. 19, § 36, 2
Stat. 31. The second bankruptcy act was passed in 1841.
The impetus was the great Panic of 1837. Warren at 52-79.
The new act was a debtors' measure with an attendant right
to a discharge for all natural persons seeking relief under
it. Bankruptcy Act 1841, Ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat. 441. After
the Civil War in 1867, the third Statute was enacted.
Bankruptcy Act 1867, Ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517. The act had
many aspects of its predecessors including termination of
bankruptcy proceedings by arrangement, assented to by
three-fourths in value of the creditors, which placed the
liquidation and distribution of assets in the hands of one
or more trustees. Id. at § 43. An amendment in 1874
(Footnote Continued)
Congress, unhappy with bankruptcy procedures, established a
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws to "study, analyze, evaluate
and recommend changes to the Bankruptcy Act". 15/ By 1978,
one observer noted that "the years of study make clear that
the two major failings of the . . . system were the lack of
simplicity in determining jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court and the low status and lack of power of the bankruptcy
judges which resulted in disrespect for their position and
inability to attract the best caliber judges". 16/ On such
recommendations, the Congress passed the Bankruptcy Act of
1978. 17/
Generally speaking, the principal changes made in
the law consisted of revision of title 11 of the United
States Code relating to bankruptcy, and a series of amend-
ments to title 28 of that Code relating to organization and
jurisdiction of the Federal courts in civil cases. 18/ In
(Footnote Continued)
increased the number of creditors and the amount of claims
required for involuntary petitions and introduced true
majority compositions as a means for terminating bankruptcy
proceedings. Act of June 22, 1874, Ch. 390, §§ 9, 12, 17,
18 Stat. 178. In 1898, the National Bankruptcy Act was
passed. Bankruptcy Act 1898, Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544. In
1938, it was amended by the Chanceller Act. That Act
strengthened the rehabilitation provisions. Act of June 22,
1938, Ch. 575, 52 Stat., § 40. In 1964, in response to
criticism that the system was defective because of the
admixture of judicial, investigator, and administrative
functions assigned to the referees, Congress gave the
Supreme Court the power to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedures. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2075 (1970). See
Stanley, Gerth, et al., Bankruptcy: Problems, Process,
Reform (1971).
15/ Public Law 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1976).
16/ H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 Cong. Rec. H7490
(daily ed. June 29, 1984).
17/ Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, codified as 11
U.S.C. § 101-151326 (Supp. 1984).
18/ Justice Brennan in Northern Pipeline described the
pre-1978 Act procedure:
(Footnote Continued)
addition, the Act established a system of bankruptcy courts
with comprehensive jurisdiction over all cases governed by
title 11 and all civil proceedings arising in or related to
cases under title 11. 19/ The Act also strengthened the
judicial status of the former referees in bankruptcy. 20/
More specifically, in terms of adjudication, the
Act established a bankruptcy court in each of the Federal
(Footnote Continued)
Before the Act, federal district courts served as
bankruptcy courts and employed a "referee" system.
Bankruptcy proceedings were generally conducted
before referees, except in those instances in
which a district court elected to withdraw a case
from a referee . . . The referee's final order was
appealable to the district court . . The
bankruptcy courts were vested with "summary
jurisdiction"--that is, with jurisdiction over
controversies involving property in the actual or
constructive possession of the court. And, with
consent, the bankruptcy court also had
jurisdiction over some "plenary" matters--such as
disputes involving property in the possession of a
third person.
The [1978] Act eliminates the referee
system .
The jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts
created by the Act is much broader than that
exercised under the former referee system.
Eliminating the distinction between "summary" and
"plenary" jurisdiction, the Act grants the new
courts jurisdiction over all "civil proceedings
arising under title 11 or arising in or related to
cases under title 11."
102 S. Ct. at 2862 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added by the
Court).
19/ Id.
20/ See 124 Cong. Rec., §§ 17404-17432 (1978).
judicial districts as an "adjunct" to the district court. 21/
The bankruptcy court judges were appointed for 14-year
terms, subject to removal by the local circuit's judicial
council on grounds of incompetence, misconduct, neglect of
duty, or disability. 22/ Their salaries, set by statute,
were subject to adjustment. 23/ Though the jurisdictional
provision vested jurisdiction in the Federal courts, in a
later section of the Act it provided that the "bankruptcy
court for the district in which a case under title 11 is
commenced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred
by this section on the district courts". 24/
B. Analysis of the Northern Pipeline Decision
In Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe-
line Co., 25/ the appellant Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. filed a-petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of
the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. 26/ While in proceedings
for reorganization, Northern filed suit against the appellee
Marathon Pipeline Company seeking damages for an alleged
breach of contract and warranty, misrepresentation, coer-
cion, and duress. 27/ The causes of action pleaded and the
remedies sought to recover damages were based on State
law. 28/ Marathon sought dismissal of the suit on the
ground-that the Act unconstitutionally conferred article III
judicial power upon judges who lacked life tenure and
21/ 28 U.S.C. § 1471(a) (Supp. 1984).
22/ Id.
23/ Id.
24/ 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (Supp. 1984).
25/ See, generally, M. Redish, supra at note 10.
26/ 102 S. Ct. at 2661.
27/ Id.
28/ The Act grants bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over
"al civil proceedings under title 11 [bankruptcy] [of the
United States Code] or arising in or related to cases under
title 11. See 18 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. 1983).
protection against salary diminution. 29/ The Bankruptcy
Court denied the motion to dismiss, but on appeal the
district court for the District of Minnesota granted the
motion. 30/
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
finding. 31/ The six-vote majority consisted of the plural-
ity opinion written by Justice Brennan and a concurring
opinion written by Justice Rehnquist joined in by Jus-
tice O'Connor. 32/ Their decision invalidated the assign-
ment by Congress to bankruptcy judges of the broad jurisdic-
tional powers granted under the Act. 33/
The plurality opinion found that the Act unconsti-
tutionally conveyed the essential attributes of article III
judicial power to the bankruptcy judge. 34/ To reach this
conclusion, the plurality first noted that the judicial
power of the United States must be exercised by judges who
have "the attribute of life tenure and protection against
29/ 102 S. Ct. at 2661.
30/ Id.
31/ Id. at 2662.
32/ Id. at 2800.
33/ Id. at 2880; also, the judicial power is defined in
§ 2 of the article as extending (1) to all cases in law and
equity arising under Constitution, laws and treaties of the
United States; (2) to cases affecting ambassadors,
ministers, and counsuls; (3) to cases in admiralty; (4) to
controversies between states or between citizens of
different states; and (5) to controversies to which the
United States is a party. Justices of the Supreme Court and
judges of the lower courts created by Congress under
article III are entitled to hold office during good
behavior, and they may not have their salaries diminished
while in office. Moreover, article III judges are appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate. U.S. Const.,
art. II, § 2.
34/ Id. at 2880.
salary diminution specified by article III". 35/ The
bankruptcy judges created under the Act were not article III
judges. 36/ Secondly, the court held that article III
prohibits Congress from establishing under its article I
powers legislative courts to exercise jurisdiction over all
matters arising under the bankruptcy laws. 37/ The estab-
lishment of such courts did not fall within any of the
recognized situations: 38/ the non-article III courts of
the Territories or District of Columbia; courts established
by Congress and the Executive to administer court martials;
and, resolution of "public rights" issues in which the
principle of independent adjudication commanded by arti-
cle III does not apply. 39/ Further, § 1471 removed the
35/ Id. at 2865; also note supra at footnote 1.
36/ Brennan notes that Congress did not constitute the
bankruptcy court as a legislative court even though "the Act
designates the bankruptcy court in each district as an
'adjunct to the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1976
ed. Supp. III).' Neither House of Congress concluded that
bankruptcy courts should be established as independent
legislative courts." Id. at 2867 n. 13.
37/ Id. at 2874.
38/ Id.
39/ Three narrow situations are subject to command that
the judicial power must be vested in article III courts.
(a) Territorial Courts, see for discussion
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 18
Harv. 272 (1855) (Congress may or may not bring within
the cognizance of art. III certain matters as it deems
proper); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511
(1828), (court acknowledged Congress' authority to
create courts for the territories). Kendall v. United
States, 12 Pet. 524 (1838), (Congress has entire
control over District of Columbia).
(b) Authority of Congress and Executive to
establish and administer court martials, see generally,
Northern Pipeline at 2868-2869.
(Footnote Continued)
essential attributes of judicial power for an article III
district court and vested those attributes in a non-
article III adjunct. 40/ Congress does not have the power
to create adjuncts to adjudicate constitutionally recognized
rights and state-created rights as it does to adjudicate
rights that it creates. 41/
The concurrence emphasized that its holding was
restricted to the unconstitutionality of the jurisdictional
(Footnote Continued)
(c) Congress has power to establish legislative
courts and administrative agencies to adjudicate cases
involving public rights, see supra at note 2. Also,
see discussion note, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76
Harvard L. Rev. 160-164 (1962); and, note,
Constitutional Law: Federal Courts: Separation of
Powers Doctrine: Court Congestion: Glidden Co. v.
Zdanak and Lark v. United States, 49 Cornell L.
Quarterly, 138-144 (1964).
40/ Northern Pipeline at 2874. Bankruptcy Courts exercise
far greater power that those adjuncts approved in either
Crowell v. Benson, supra, and United States v. Raddatz, 447
U.S. 667 (1980). Id. at 2879. In Crowell and Raddatz, the
Court approved the use of administrative officers and
magistrates as adjuncts to article III courts. Crowell
involved adjudication of Congressionally created rights.
The Court approved fact finding by an administrative agency;
approved the limited power to issue orders pursuant to
specialized procedures as long as enforcement could be
carried out only by an article III court; and agency orders
could be set aside if not supported by evidence. See
Crowell, 38-45.
41/ Northern Pipeline at 2875-2876. Also see United
States v. Raddatz, supra, in which the Court-upheld the 1978
Federal Magistrates Act, which sustained the use of adjunct
fact-finders even in the adjudication of Constitutional
rights as long as the adjuncts were subject to the direct
control of an article III court. The Court held that the
magistrates' proposed findings were subject to "de novo"
review by the district court, which was free to rehear the
evidence or to call for additional evidence. Id. at
667-677. See generally, note, United States v. Raddatz:
Judicial Economy at the Expense of Constitutional
Guarantees, 47 Brooklyn L. Rev. 559-596 (1981).
grant to the bankruptcy judge of the power to adjudicate
claims or causes of action based upon State law. 42/ The
concurrence saw no need to decide the constitutionality of
the jurisdictional grant of other article III judicial
powers. 43/ There was agreement between the plurality and
the concurrence that causes of action based upon State law
were a judicial power and could not be exercised by an
article III court. 44/ Further, the majority also concurred
42/ Northern Pipeline at 2881-2882.
I would, therefore, hold so much of the Bankruptcy Act of
1978 as enables a Bankruptcy Court to entertain and decide
Northern's lawsuit over Marathon's objection to be violative
of Art. III of the United States Constitution. Because I
agree with the plurality that this grant of authority is not
readily severable from the remaining grant of authority to
Bankruptcy Courts under § 241(a) see ante, at 2880 n. 40, I
concur in the judgment. I also agree with the discussion in
Part V of the plurality opinion respecting retroactivity and
the staying of the judgment of this Court.
43/ Id. at 2881.
44/ Id., also see discussion:
It is clear that, at the least, the new bankruptcy judges
cannot constitutionally be vested with jurisdiction to
decide this state-law contract claim against Northern
Pipeline. As part of a comprehensive restructuring of the
bankruptcy laws, Congress has vested jurisdiction over this
and all matters related to cases under title 11 in a single
non-Art. III court, and has done so pursuant to a single
statutory grant of jurisdiction. In these circumstances, we
cannot conclude that if Congress were aware that the grant
of jurisdiction could not constitutionally encompass this
and similar claims, it would simply remove the jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy court over these matters, leaving the
jurisdictional provision and adjudicatory structure intact
with respect to other types of claims, and thus subject to
Art. III constitutional challenge on a claim-by-claim basis.
Indeed, we note that one of the express purposes of the Act
was to ensure adjudication of all claims in a single forum
and to avoid the delay and expense of jurisdictional
disputes. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, supra, pp. 43-48; S.
(Footnote Continued)
in the holding that the district court must be more than an
appellate or reviewing court when it adjudicates state-based
claims. 45/ The broad jurisdiction grant to the bankruptcy
courts reduced the rule of article III courts to one of the
appellate review. 46/ Thus, both opinions agreed that the
bankruptcy judges could not be perceived as adjuncts to the
article III courts to whom jurisdiction was granted by the
Act.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY ADJUDICATION: CONGRESSIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS OF ARTICLE III AND ARTICLE I COURTS
The drafters of the Constitution considered the
creation of uniform bankruptcy law so important that they
(Footnote Continued)
Rep. No. 95-989, p. 17 (1978). Nor can we assume, as the
Chief Justice suggests, post, at 2, that Congress' choice
would be to have this case "routed to the United States
district court of which the bankruptcy court is an adjunct."
We think that it is for Congress to determine the proper
manner of restructuring the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 to
conform to the requirements of Art. III, in the way that
will best effectuate the legislative purpose.
Id. at 2880, n. 40.
45/ Id. at 2881.
46/ Justice Rehnquist states:
I am likewise of the opinion that the extent of review by
Art. III courts provided on appeal from a decision of the
Bankruptcy Court in a case such as Northern's does not save
the grant of authority to the latter under the rule espoused
in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 285, 76 L.
Ed. 598 (1932). All matters of fact and law in whatever
domains of the law to which the parties' dispute may lead
are to be resolved by the Bankruptcy Court in the first
instance, with only traditional appellate review apparently
contemplated by Art. III courts. Acting in this manner the
Bankruptcy Court is not an "adjunct" of either the District
Court or the Court of Appeals.
Id. at 2882.
included it in a special section of article I. 47/ This was
one of the great reforms of the Constitution as the Founding
Fathers wanted to get away from the concept of debtors
prison with the establishment of the so-called fresh
start. 48/ Thus, Congress under this constitutional scheme
is given very broad plenary powers to establish national
bankruptcy legislation.
Although Congress has plenary jurisdiction over
bankruptcy, the plurality in the Northern Pipeline decision
almost exclusively couched their opinion in terms of arti-
cle I versus article III. 49/ It is not surprising then to
find Congress responding wi-th a number of highly debated
legislative measures also couched in terms of article I
versus article III. 50/ Congress has found that constitu-
tionally bankruptcy adjudication rests on four separate
propositions: 51/ (1) the bankruptcy judge as an adjunct
under the supervision of the article III district court;
(2) non-core bankruptcy function of restructuring debtor-
creditor rights need be decided by an article III judge;
47/ Article I, § 8, cl. 4 of the U.S. Constitution states:
"The Congress shall have power . . . to establish uniform
laws on the subject of Bankruptcy." Article III vests
judicial power in one Supreme Court "and in such inferior
courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish". With respect to judges, Article III also
requires that tenure during good behavior be granted and
that a judge's salary not be reduced while in office. These
requirements are institutional protections to insure the
independence and impartiality of the federal judiciary,
supra, note 1.
48/ See generally S. Riesenfeld, The Evolution of Modern
Bankruptcy Law, 31 Minn. L. Rev. 401 (1947).
49/ Brennan states: "The question is whether the
assignment . . . by Congress to bankruptcy judges of the
jurisdiction granted . . . [in] the Bankruptcy Act of
1978 . . . violates Art. III of the Constitution." Northern
Pipeline, supra, 2862.
50/ Congressional Research Service, Major Legislation of
the Congress, MLC-008, 5 (1984).
51/ 130 Cong. Rec. E1107-9 (daily ed. March 20, 1984).
(3) parties' consent to a bankruptcy judge's jurisdiction
over their case by specifically waiving their statutory
right to trial by an article III judge in the first in-
stance; and, (4) the parties' right to a full and automatic
appeal to an article III court.
A. Article III Approach
H.R. 3 provides an example of an article III
approach. 52/ Strongly supported by the leadership of the
House Judiciary Committee, the bill proposed to establish a
new bankruptcy court structured by establishing a court of
record known as the U.S. Bankruptcy Court. 53/ The legis-
lation provided for appointment of the bankruptcy judge
under article III of the Constitution. 54/ The legislation
sought guarantees of tenure and freedom from salary dimi-
nution. 55/ The proposal granted the bankruptcy court
original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases arising
under title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and conferred original,
but not exclusive jurisdiction over all civil proceedings
arising either under title 11 or related to cases under
title 11. 56/
The opponents of this measure argued that this
approach had many disadvantages. 57/ First, it would
require an enormous increase in the number of life-tenured
52/ The core of the controversy surrounding the attempt to
reform the bankruptcy system is the division between the
House and Senate over what approach to take to resolve the
jurisdictional problems raised by Northern Pipeline. H.R. 3
favors an article III approach in contrast to the article I
approach of S. 1013. This distinction is crucial, because
it determines the authority and status of the judges who
will decide the cases. Congressional Research Service,
supra, note 50.
53/ 130 Cong. Rec., supra, note 51.
54/ Id.
55/ Id.
56/ Id.
57/ Id. at E1108.
judges. 58/ The number of article III judges would increase
by thirty-five percent. 59/ "Moreover, this increase would
be irrevocable. Article III judges can be removed only by
impeachment." 60/ Second, the bill would involve a diffi-
cult transition period. 61/ For more than two years, lame
duck non-tenured bankruptcy judges would exercise the same
powers the Supreme Court held unconstitutional in Northern
Pipeline. 62/ Third, opponents would hold that article III
bankruptcy courts are unnecessary. 63/ Suggesting that they
are not required by the Northern Pipeline decision, one
commentator concluded:
The otherwise able lawyers who favor article III
bankruptcy courts contend that they cannot under-
stand the Northern Pipeline decision and that only
an article III court is free from constitutional
doubts. That is simply not so.
Northern Pipeline held only that judges who
were neither appointed under article II nor
subject to control by an article III court could
decide suits that were not integral to a bankrupt-
cy case. Northern Pipeline expressly approved
prior Supreme Court cases that allow non-
article III judges to perform other tasks. 64/
Further, the creation of an article III Bankruptcy
court would give bankruptcy cases more preferential treat-
ment or would involve strong pressure to allow article III
bankruptcy judges to decide other types of cases. 65/ This
58/ Id.
59/ Id.
60/ Id.
61/ Id.
62/ Id.
63/ Id.
64/ Id.
65/ Id.
view is bolstered by the argument that "bankruptcy cases
should not be heard by the district courts because they
would have to wait in line with other cases." 66/ Bankrupt-
cy cases are not more important than criminal, civil rights,
antitrust, and other Federal cases. 67/ Finally, it is
suggested that bankruptcy cases must be handled quickly, and
this can be done more efficiently by non-article III
courts. 68/
A related criticism holds that if bankruptcy
filings decline, there would be strong pressure to allow
article III bankruptcy judges to decide other types of
cases. 69/ "The danger in this" reports one critic, "is
that the bankruptcy judges may not be qualified to decide
these cases. 70/ These judges were chosen without regard
for their fitness to hear criminal, civil rights, and other
cases that require broader social and legal experiences." 71/
Further, it is suggested that raising the bankruptcy courts
to article III status does not automatically increase the
quality of the applicants. 72/ Presidential appointment
decreases the pool of qualified applicants because only
66/ Id.
67/ Id.
68/ Id.
69/ Id.
70/ Id.
71/ Id.
72/ Id.
those applicants in the President's party are likely to be
chosen. 73/ Further it is noted: 74/
Presidential appointment works well for district
and circuit judges, because many qualified lawyers
are willing to serve, the range and importance of
issues to be handled makes it appropriate to
consider a potential judge's political philosophy,
and the large impact and high visibility that an
individual judge can have induces the President to
choose a well-qualified candidate. The same
conditions do not exist with respect to bankruptcy
judgeships. There is not a huge pool of obviously
qualified candidates, and the President does not
have as strong an incentive to choose the best
qualified of those candidates.
Most critics suggest that a non-article III approach would
be likely to produce the most qualified candidates. 75/
Bankruptcy judges chosen by the Court of Appeals, for
example, would likely come from a pool of the "best-
qualified candidates regardless of political affili-
ation". 76/
73/ Id. at E1109.
74/ Id.; But see Justice White observes:
. no one seriously argues that the Bankruptcy Reform Act
represents an attempt by the political branches of
government to aggrandize themselves at the expense of the
third branch or an attempt to undermine the authority of
constitutional courts in general. Indeed, the congressional
perception of a lack of judicial interest in bankruptcy
matters was one of the factors that led to the establishment
of the bankruptcy courts: Congress feared that this lack of
interest would lead to a failure by federal district courts
to deal with bankruptcy matters in an expeditious manner.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1977); cited
in Northern Pipeline, supra at 2895.
75/ Id. at E1109.
76/ Id.
B. The Article I Approach
1. Advocates for Mandatory Abstention.
The Senate passed an article I scheme for bank-
ruptcy judges in S. 1013. 77/ The basic provisions of the
Senate measure allowed the use of bankruptcy judges as
magistrates to handle bankruptcy cases or proceedings
withdrawn by the district courts. 78/ The Senate bill
required a bankruptcy forum to abstain when a State law
claim had been filed in a State court of competent juris-
diction. 79/ The provision, known as mandatory abstention,
was a central fixture of the Senate approach. 80/
Advocates of the Senate approach for mandatory
abstention would argue that permitting Federal court adjudi-
cation of State law claims that could not otherwise be
brought in Federal court gives the district courts and
bankruptcy judges powers beyond the scope of arti-
cle III. 81/ The concern is that a "purely State law case
could be litigated in Federal court without the Federal
question jurisdiction necessary under the Constitution for
Federal court adjudication". 82/
Further, it is advocated that the Northern Pipe-
line decision is limited only to the question that bankrupt-
cy judges cannot adjudicate claims or causes of action based
77/ Congressional Research Service, supra.
78/ 130 Cong. Rec. S8887-8888 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
79/ Id.
80/ Id. at 8887-8898.
81/ Id. at 8890.
82/ Id. Article III, § 2 specifies the type of cases that
may be litigated in the Federal courts. Other than the
cases involving a State as a party, these types of cases are
basically two--cases "arising under Federal law and cases
between the citizens of different states". U.S. CONST.
upon State law. 83/ Northern Pipeline did not decide that
article III courts could constitutionally decide "all"
claims or actions based on State law. 84/ Permitting
district courts to exercise jurisdiction over related-to
claims only partially solves the problem created by Northern
Pipeline. Conferring jurisdiction on district courts
without some independent basis creates an even greater
constitutional problem. 85/
Moreover, the failure to adopt mandatory absten-
tion restores the rule of Swift v. Tyson. 86/ Proponents of
the Senate measure support this conclusion by noting that
"this danger is not that Federal courts will ignore State
law, but that they will be interpreting State law in the
absence of constitutional jurisdiction". 87/ It is argued
83/ Id. See Chief Justice Burger, dissenting:
• . . the court does not hold today that Congress'
broad grant of jurisdiction to the new bankruptcy
courts is generally inconsistent with Article III
of the Constitution. Rather, the Court's holding
is limited to the proposition stated by Justice
Rehnquist in his concurrence in the judgment--that
a "traditional" state commonlaw action, not made
subject to a federal rule of decision, and related
only peripherally to an adjudication of bankruptcy
under federal law, must, absent the consent of the
litigants, be heard by an "article III court" if
it is to be heard by any court or agency of the
United States. This limited holding, of course,
does not suggest that there is something
inherently unconstitutional about the new
bankruptcy courts; nor does it preclude such
courts from adjudicating all but a relatively
narrow category of claims "arising under" or
"arising in or related to cases under" the
Bankruptcy Act.
84/ 130 Cong. Rec., supra, S8896.
85/ Id., S8893.
86/ Id.; see Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
87/ 130 Cong. Rec., supra, S8893.
that Erie v. Tompkins "stands for the proposition that
Federal courts should not be reaching their own interpreta-
tion of State law without an article III basis". 88/ One
commentator points out: 89/
In the absence of the bankruptcy of one party, no
one questions that a State tort or contract claim
would be adjudicated to completion in State court
without any feasible assertion of Federal question
jurisdiction. Financial status, however, is not
mentioned as a qualification for Federal question
jurisdiction in article III. Thus, the provisions
allowing any case "related to" bankruptcy to be
adjudicated in Federal court violates article III.
Purely State law claims cannot be adjudicated in a
Federal court.
There is a sense that depriving certain parties the pro-
tections of State law merely because "they happen to be
doing business with or be injured by a party who later went
bankrupt" imposes a jurisdictional deprivation. 90/ The
State law claimant may not litigate in the forum in which
the injury or infraction arose, but rather might be forced
to litigate great distances for the situs of the harm. 91/
Thus, the lack of mandatory abstention is perceived as a-
bypassing of the Constitution preservation of State courtjurisdiction over purely State law issues.
Finally, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1979 was
styled as a bill to promote more efficiency by consolidating
all State law authority in the Federal courts. 92/ Propo-
nents of mandatory abstention contend that the F-ederal
government is not promoting uniformity. It is noted:
Federal government is not always the most
efficient system. It does not always promote
88/ Id.; see Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
89/ 130 Cong. Rec., supra, S8893.
90/ Id.
91/ Id.
92/ Id. at S8897.
uniformity. What it has done, however, over the
past two centuries is help protect our liberties
by separating and dispersing governmental
authority, including judicial authority. The
issue is which level of government ought to
interpret State law--the Federal courts or the
State courts. The Constitution resolved that
question in article III and this bill is infirm to
the degree it departs therefrom. 93/
2. Conference Report: Bankruptcy Amendments of
1984. 94/
Despite the concerns for mandatory abstention, the
legislation ultimately adopted was H.R. 5174. 95/ Patterned
after the interim rules promulgated by the Judicial Confer-
ence after the Northern Pipeline decision, the original
House version somewhat paralleled S. 1013 in its article I
approach. 96/ As the product of the Conference Report, H.R.
5174 contained an article I structure basically the same as
it had passed the House; provision for authorizing the
appointment of 85 district and circuit court judges; and,
substantive changes in the Bankruptcy Code in the so-called
consumer credit amendments. 97/ The following briefly
analyzes the amendments relating to the article I structure.
a. Section 101(a): This section provides for
Federal district courts to have original jurisdiction 98/
93/ Id. at S8893.
94/ H.R. 5174, supra, note 16.
95/ 130 Cong. Rec. E1107, (daily ed. March 20, 1984).
96/ Id.
97/ H.R. 5174, supra, note 16.
98/ TITLE I--BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE.
Sec. 101. (a) Section 1334 of of title 28, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
§ 1334. Bankruptcy cases and proceedings
(Footnote Continued)
over all civil proceedings "arising under," "arising in," or
"related to" cases under title 11. This section of the bill
amends §§ 1334 (a), (b), and (c) (2). 99/ These subsections
(Footnote Continued)
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, the district courts shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under
title 11.
H.R. 5174, Conference Report, supra, note 16.
99/ § 1334. Bankruptcy cases and proceedings.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that
confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts
other than the district courts, the district courts
shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of
all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or
arising in or related to cases under title 11.
(c) (1) Nothing in this section prevents a
district court in the interest of justice, or in the
interest of comity with State courts or respect for
State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular
proceeding arising under title 11 or arising or related
to a case under title 11.
(2) Upon timely motion of a party in a
proceeding based upon a State law claim or State
law cause of action, related to a case under
title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising
in a case under title 11, with respect to which an
action could not have been commenced in a court of
the United States absent jurisdiction under this
section, the district court shall abstain from
hearing such proceeding if an action is commenced,
and can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of
appropriate jurisdiction. Any decision to abstain
made under this subsection is not reviewable by
appeal or otherwise. This subsection shall not be
construed to limit the applicability of the stay
provided for by section 362 of title 11, United
States Code, as such section applies to an action
affecting the property of the estate in
bankruptcy.
(Footnote Continued)
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vest jurisdiction for adjudication of all actions based upon
State law in article III courts. 100/ Before Northern
Pipeline, bankruptcy courts exercised jurisdiction over
these pure state-created actions by viewing them as "related
to cause under Title 11." 101/ The Supreme Court had held
that these functions were judicial, and under the Constitu-
tion judicial power could only be exercised by article III
courts. 102/
b. Section 104(a): Title 28 is amended adding
Chapter 6, which includes §§ 151 through 158. 103/ Sec-
tion 151 provides for a bankruptcy court in each unit of the
district court. 104/ Section 152 establishes the procedures
for appointment of bankruptcy judges by the circuit Court of
Appeals for each circuit after considering the
(Footnote Continued)
(d) The district court in which a case under
title 11 is commenced or is pending shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever
located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such
case, and of the estate.
100/ 130 Cong. Rec., S. 8896.
101/ Id.
102/ Id.
103/ H.R. 5174, Conference Report, supra, note 16.
104/ S 151. Designation of bankruptcy courts.
In each judicial district, the bankruptcy judges in regular
active service shall constitute a unit of the district court
to be known as the bankruptcy court for that district. Each
bankruptcy judge, as a judicial officer of the district
court, may exercise the authority conferred under this
chapter with respect to any action, suit, or proceeding and
may preside alone and hold a regular or special session of
the court, except as otherwise provided by law or by rule or
order of the district court.
Id.
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recommendations of the Judicial Conference. 105/ Each
bankruptcy judge is to serve a term of fourteen years. A
bankruptcy judge may be removed only for incompetence,
misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental
disability by the judicial council of the circuit in which
the judge's duty station is located. 106/ Section 153
provides for a salary at an annual rate determined by the
Federal Salary Act. 107/ Section 154 allows a division of
105/ § 152. Appointment of bankruptcy judges.
(a) (1) The United States court of appeals for the
circuit shall appoint bankruptcy judges for thejudicial districts established in paragraph (2) in such
numbers as are established in such paragraph. Such
appointments shall be made after considering the
recommendations of the Judicial Conference submitted
pursuant to subsection (b). Each bankruptcy judge
shall be appointed for a term of fourteen years,
subject to the provisions of subsection (e).
Bankruptcy judges shall serve as judicial officers of
the United States district court established under
Article III of the Constitution.
Id.
106/ (e) A bankruptcy judge may be removed during
the term for which such bankruptcy judge is appointed,
only for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or
physical or mental disability and only by the judicial
council of the circuit in which the judge's official
duty station is located. Removal may not occur unless
a majority of all of the judges of such council concur
in the order of removal. Before any order of removal
may be entered, a full specification of charges shall
be furnished to such bankruptcy judge who shall be
accorded an opportunity to be heard on such charges.
Id.
107/ § 153. Salaries; character of service.
(a) Each bankruptcy judge shall serve on a
full-time basis and shall receive as full compensation
for his services a salary at an annual rate determined
(Footnote Continued)
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business and an appointment of a chief judge in each
district court having more than one bankruptcy judge. 108/
Section 155 permits a bankruptcy judge to be transferred to
serve temporarily as a bankruptcy judge in any judicial
district. 109/ Section 156 established a staff to support
the bankruptcy court. Section 157 (a) through (d)
establishes the procedures under which the bankruptcy court
may operate. 110/ Subsection 157(a) provides for referral
(Footnote Continued)
under section 225 of the Federal Salary Act of 1967 (2
U.S.C. 351-361) as adjusted by section 461 of this
title, to be paid at such times as the Judicial
Conference of the United States determines.
Id.
108/ See § 154. Division of business; Chief judge., Id.
109/ H.R. 5174, supra, H. 7473.
110/ § 157. Procedures.
(a) Each district court may provide that any or
all cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings
arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a
case under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy
judges for the district.
(b) (1) Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine
all cases under title 11 and all core proceedings
arising under title 11, or arising in a case under
title 11, referred under subsection (a) of this
section, and may enter appropriate orders and
judgments, subject to review under section 158 of this
title.
(2) Core proceedings include, but are not
limited to--
(A) matters concerning the administration of the
estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against
the estate or exemptions from property of the estate,
and estimation of claims or interest for the purposes
of confirming a plan under chapter 11 or 13 of title 11
(Footnote Continued)
of "all cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings
arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case
(Footnote Continued)
but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or
unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death
claims against the estate for purposes of distribution
in a case under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons
filing claims against the estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover
preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul or modify the
automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover
fraudulent conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of
particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or
priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property,
including the use of cash collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other
than property resulting from claims brought by the
estate against persons who have not filed claims
against the estate; and
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of
the assets of the estate or the adjustment of the
debtor-creditor or the equity-security holder
relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful
death claims.
(3) The bankruptcy judge shall determine, on
the judge's own motion or on timely motion of a party,
whether a proceeding is a core proceeding under this
subsection or is a proceeding that is otherwise related
to a case under title 11. A determination that a
proceeding is not a core proceeding shall not be made
solely on the basis that its resolution may be affected
by State law.
(4) Non-core proceedings under
(Footnote Continued)
under title ll." 1ii/ Subsections (b) (1) through (5)
impower bankruptcy-judges to hear and determine all core
(Footnote Continued)
section 157(b) (2) (B) of title 28, United States Code,
shall not be subject to the mandatory abstention
provisions of section 1334(c) (2).
(5) The district court shall order that
personal injury tort and wrongful death claims shall be
tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy
case is pending, or in the district court in the
district in which the claim arose, as determined by the
dist:ict court in which the bankruptcy case is pending.
(c) (1) A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding
that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise
related to a case under title 11. In such proceeding,
the bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law to the district court, and
any final order or judgment shall be entered by the
district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge's
proposed findings and conclusions and after reviewing
de novo those matters to which any party has timely and
specifically objected.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of
paragraph (1) of this subsection, the district court,
with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding,
may refer a proceeding related to a case under title 11
to a bankruptcy judge to hear and determine and to
enter appropriate orders and judgements, subject to
review under section 158 of this title.
(d) The district court may withdraw, in whole or
in part, any case or proceeding referred under this
section, on its own motion or on timely motion of any
party, for cause shown. The district court shall, on
timely motion of a party, so withdraw a proceeding if
the court determines that resolution of the proceeding
requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws
of the United States regulating organizations or
activities affecting interstate commerce.
H.R. 5174, Conference Report, supra, at H. 7473.
111/ Id.
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proceedings, subject to traditional appellate review. 112/
One Congressional commentator notes that "this jurisdiction
in core bankruptcy proceedings is broader than the summary
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts under pre-1978
law". 113/ This subsection also attempts to insure that the
liquidation or estimation of contingent personal injury tort
112/ Id. § 157. Procedures.
(5) The district court shall order that
personal injury tort and wrongful death claims shall be
tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is
pending, or in the district court in the district in which
the claim arose, as determined by the district court in
which the bankruptcy case is pending.
(c) (1) A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding
that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise
related to a case under title 11. In such proceeding,
the bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law to the district court, and
any final order or judgment shall be entered by the
district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge's
proposed findings and conclusions and after reviewing
de novo those matters to which any party has timely and
specifically objected.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of
paragraph (1) of this sub-section, the district court,
with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding,
may refer a proceeding related to a case under title 11
to a bankruptcy judge to hear and determine and to
enter appropriate orders and judgments, subject to
review under section 158 of this title.
(d) The district court may withdraw, in whole or
in part, any case or proceeding referred under this
section, on its own motion or on timely motion of any
party, for cause shown. The district court shall, on
timely motion of a party, so withdraw a proceeding if
the court determines that resolution of the proceeding
requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws
of the United States regulating organizations or
activities affecting interestate commerce.
113/ H.R. 5174, Conference Report, supra, at H. 7473.
claims not be considered "core proceedings," removing them
to the district court. The bankruptcy judge may conduct a
hearing and enter a proposed judgment in State law cases,
but the district court enters the final judgment after
reviewing the transcript. 114/ The parties may consent to
have a bankruptcy judge enter a judgment, without waiving
the right to appellate review. 115/ Finally, subsection (d)
provides for recall to the district of all proceedings
involving claims that do not arise under title 11, are not
proceedings arising under title 11, or are proceedings
arising in a case under title 11. 116/
Section 158 establishes the appeals procedure. It
provides for the "district courts of the Unites States" to
have "jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments,
orders, and decrees . . ." 117/ The judicial council may
establish a bankruptcy appellate panel, but no appeal may be
referred to the panel unless the district judges for the
114/ Id.
115/ Id.
116/ Id.
117/ § 158. Appeals.
(a) The district courts of the United States
shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final
judgments, orders, and decrees, and, with leave of the
court, from interlocutory orders and decrees, of
bankruptcy judges entered in cases and proceedings
referred to the bankruptcy judges under section 157 of
this title. An appeal under this subsection shall be
taken only to the district court for the judicial
district in which the bankruptcy judge is serving.
(b) (1) The judicial council of a circuit may
establish a bankruptcy appellate panel, comprised of
bankruptcy judges from districts within the circuit, to
hear and determine, upon the consent of all the
parties, appeals under subsection (a) of this section.
H.R. 5174, Conference Report, supra, at H. 7474.
district, by majority vote, authorize such referral. 118/
The procedures attempt to correct the holding in the North-
ern Pipeline decision that the bankruptcy judge's power, as
granted under the Code, impermissibly reduced the Code's
broad jurisdictional grant to the article III courts to one
of appellate review. 119/ The court noted that "acting in
this manner the Bankruptcy Court is not an 'adjunct' of
either the District or the Court of Appeals". 120/
c. Section 121: This section amends § 122 of the
Act. It provides that the bill should become effective on
the date it is enacted. The provision means that the
amendments do not apply to title 11 proceedings pending in
district court. At the time the legislation was passed,
bankruptcy claims were being adjudicated by bankruptcy
judges with district courts serving the review function as
provided by the Emergency Rules. Applying the amendments in
such a way extends the life of the Emergency Rules for those
adjudications under title 11 that are pending prior to the
effective date of the Act.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE STATUTORY SCHEME
AND CONGRESSIONAL POLICY
Congress styled the jurisdictional provisions of
the Bankruptcy Act to conform exactly to those previously
upheld by the Supreme Court. 121/ To accomplish this
118/ Id.
119/ Id.
120/ Id.
121/ 130 Cong. Rec. E1108 (daily ed. March 20, 1984); note
also Interview with Sally Rogers, Staff Counsel for Senator
Thurmond, Senate Judiciary Committee (July 17, 1984):
* * * if Brennan's position had gotten another
vote and were indeed the majority opinion of the Court,
that opinion would probably have dictated . . . you fit
in one of these pigeonholes . . . territorial court or
public right or whatever, you have to be an Article III
judge, and it would be very unclear how much of the
bankruptcy jurisdiction would fall into those
(Footnote Continued)
scheme, proponents of the amendment reduced the Northern
Pipeline decision to two principles and styled the Amend-
ments after the Federal Magistrates Act of 1984. 122/ In
doing so, Congress intended to accomplish two things:
first, develop a statutory scheme that offered constitution-
al certainty; 123/ and, second, develop a fair and flexible
bankruptcy adjudication system for the courts and the
litigants. 124/ The basic provisions of the Bankruptcy
Amendments, therefore, can best be illuminated by a brief
analysis of these constitutional considerations. Further, a
short discussion of Congressional policy will be useful in
understanding rationale behind the statutory scheme.
(Footnote Continued)
pigeonholes.
• . . the true scope of the Northern Pipeline
opinion is to be found in reading Rehnquist's and
O'Connor's concurring opinion, which gave them the
majority result . . . Rehnquist basically says, "I
don't know what article III and non-article III can do
or not do, I just know they cannot do what they tried
to do here. You have to be an article III judge to
hear this type of case."
122/ Commentary of H.R. 5174, Congressman Kastenmeier
notes: My amendment is entirely consistent with the Supreme
Court's opinion in Northern Pipeline. Northern Pipeline
held that: First, bankruptcy judges were not true adjuncts
of the district courts because the district courts had no
control over them; and second, 'a separate non-article III
court could not properly decide State law claims that were
not integral to the core bankruptcy function of
restructuring debtor-creditor rights.
Id. at E1109.
123/ Id. at E1107-1108.
124/ Id. at E1107-1109.
A. Constitutional Considerations
1. Bankruptcy judges as adjuncts of district
court.
As a general rule, the bankruptcy judge must be a
subordinate part of the article III court and not a distinct
entity. 125/ Under the amendments, the bankruptcy judges
perform judicial duties which would otherwise be performed
by an article III district judge. 126/ The legislation
"vests bankruptcy jurisdiction in the district court with
the adjunct article I bankruptcy court to exercise jurisdic-
tion". 127/ The district court directly controls the range
of duties and responsibilities of the adjuncts whom they
appoint as well as the procedure they follow. 128/ In this
manner, the bankruptcy court does not operate as a separate,
specialized tribunal; rather, Congress has determined that
the jurisdiction exercised by the court is that of the
district court itself.
Proponents draw an analogy between the bankruptcy
courts and legislative and administrative courts. 129/ The
125/ Northern Pipeline, supra, at 2874.
126/ H.R. 5174, Conference Report, supra, § 101(a)
amending § 1334.
127/ Id.
128/ Id. at § 104(a) amending § 157, Procedures.
129/ Congressman Kastenmeier, principal sponsor of
H.R. 5174, notes: "The powers that bankruptcy judges would
perform . . . conform exactly to those previously upheld by
the Supreme Court. Their powers in Northern Pipeline-type
suits are identical to the Magistrates which the Supreme
Court upheld in United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667
(1980)." 130 Cong. Rec. E1108; note also, " . . .the new
bankruptcy courts are very similar, in fact, almost parallel
to the magistrates courts. One of the victories for the
bankruptcy judges is that the legislation called these
officials judges, as opposed to magistrates, or referees.
There was some sentiment that they not be called judges."
Interview with Peter Velde, Staff Counsel, Senate
Sub-committee on the Courts (July 17, 1984).
Supreme Court has frequently upheld the judicial power of
legislative courts and has never found that such power has
been improperly committed to administrative agencies in the
first instance. 130/ Underscoring this view are the Con-
gressional proceedings of the Conference Report: 131/
The powers that bankruptcy judges would perform
under my amendment conform exactly to those
previously upheld by the Supreme Court. Their
powers in Northern Pipeline-type suits are identi-
cal to the powers of magistrates which the Supreme
Court upheld in United States v. Raddatz, 447
U.S. 667 (1980), and approved in Northern
Pipeline.
Congress has delegated the fact-finding and decision-making
function to both types of tribunals in many areas of
law, 132/ including some historically subject to commonlaw
adjudication. 133/ The decision of these two bodies are
often final and unenforceable, subject only to subsequent
appeal in an article III court.
It is not surprising to find a teaching of the
Magistrate experience cited by the Northern Pipeline
decision in that there must be more than simple appellate
review. 134/ Acknowledging this fact, Congress designed in
the Bankruptcy Amendments 135/ and Federal Magistrates
130/ Davis, supra, at note 7.
131/ 130 Cong. Rec. at E1108. The sponsors note the
bankruptcy judges' powers are like those of an
administrative agency, upheld in Crowell, supra, at note 2,
and also approved in Northern Pipeline, supra. Id.
132/ Supra at note 3.
133/ See K. Davis, Administrative Law Text 524-44 (3rd ed.
1979).
134/ Northern Pipeline, supra, at 2879, n. 39.
135/ H.R. 5174, supra; see note 11.
Acts 136/ "de novo determination" 137/ with respect to the
adjuncts' findings by the district court. An appeal to an
article court lies in every instance for a decision of an
adjunct. 138/ This vital safeguard protects the bankruptcyjudge's decisions from jurisdictional attack, even assuming
the position of some of the critics that the bankruptcyjudges could not constitutionally exercise any adjudicator
power as a "de facto" independent entity from the
article III courts. 139/
2. Traditional bankruptcy claims can be adjudi-
cated by non-article III judges.
The thrust of the Northern Pipeline holding is
that peripheral, non-traditional issues such as claims by
the bankrupt against non-creditors cannot be adjudicated by
a non-article III judge. 140/ The bankruptcy amendments
136/ 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(c).
137/ Hearing de novo. Generally, a new hearing or a
hearing for a second time, contemplating an entire trial in
same manner in which matter was originally heard and a
review of previous hearing. On hearing "de novo" court
hears matter as court of original and not appellate
jurisdiction. Black Law Dictionary 649 (5th ed. 1979). See
Collier & Wallis v. Astor, 9 Cal. 2d 202, 70 P.2d 171, 173.
138/ H.R. 5174, supra; see note 117. Also United States
v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 683 and n. 11.
139/ 130 Cong. Rec. at E1108 (daily ed. March 20, 1984).
140/ The powers the bankruptcy judge may exercise depend
upon whether the proceeding arises under Statp law or
Federal bankruptcy law. The Supreme Court states in
Northern Pipeline:
[W]hen Congress creates a statutory right, it
clearly has the discretion, in defining that
right, to create presumption, or assign burdens of
proof, or prescribe remedies; it may also provide
that persons seeking to vindicate that right must
do so before particularized tribunals created to
perform that specialized adjudicative task related
(Footnote Continued)
respond to this holding in several ways. 141/ First, the
amendment authorizes bankruptcy judges to decide only core
proceedings, subject to appellate review. 142/ Core pro-
ceedings include all those in which the right to relief is
created by Federal law, "whether or not the proceeding
concerns property in the possession or constructive posses-
sion of the trustee". 143/ Second, the legislation insti-
tutes several protective features for the adjudication of
all bankruptcy cases "related" and traditional. 144/
District courts have specific authority to revoke the
referral of any case to the bankruptcy court upon the
district court's own motion or upon the request of the party
for any reason. 145/ Finally, district courts may hold a
hearing and receive evidence in cases first adjudicated by
the bankruptcy court. The district court need give no
difference to the bankruptcy judge's factual finding or
interpretations of law. 146/ The district court may modify,
in whole or in part, any order or judgment issued by the
bankruptcy judge. 147/
3. Impact of Consent of the Parties.
Whether Congress can authorize bankruptcy judges
to exercise jurisdiction over article III cases and contro-
versies is not a constitutional issue because of consent of
(Footnote Continued)
to that right. Such provisions do, in a sense,
affect the exercise of judicial power, but they
are also incidental to Congress' power to define
the right that it has created. 458 U.S. at 83.
Kastenmeier, Id. at E1109.
141/ Id.
142/ Id.; also see note 117.
143/ Id.; 130 Cong. Rec. H7493 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
144/ Id.; also see note 99.
145/ Id.; also see note 112.
146/ Id.; also see note 112.
147/ Id.; see also note 112.
the parties. 148/ The Bankruptcy Amendments limit the civil
trial jurisdic-ton of the bankruptcy judges "to those
proceedings related to a case under title 11 . . . " and, to
"hear and determine and enter appropriate orders and judg-
ments, subject to review . . . " 149/ In short, the liti-gants retain an absolute right to have their civil case
tried by an article III judge. 150/ They must affirmatively
and mutually relinquish that right in order for the bank-
ruptcy court to try the litigation.
In Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court did not
consider the constitutional implications of consent by theparties to go before a non-article judge, because theparties did not consent to such a procedure. 151/ However,
the court did indicate that consent is important to the
constitutional analysis. Brennan in his plurality opinion
notes that "[b]efore the Act the referee had no jurisdic-
tion, except with consent, over controversies beyond thoseinvolving property in the actual or constructive possession
of the court". 152/ Rehnquist in his concurring opinion
comments: "I would, therefore, hold so much of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1978 as enables a Bankruptcy Court to enter-
tain and decide Northern's lawsuit over Marathon's objection
to be violative of Art. III of the United States Constitu-
tion." 153/ Burger in his dissenting opinion offers this
observation: " . . . a 'traditional' State commonlaw
action, not made subject to a Federal rule of decision, and
related only peripherally to an adjudication of bankruptcy
under Federal law, must, absent the consent of the
litigants, be heard by an 'Article III court' . .
148/ 130 Cong. Rec. at ELI10 (daily ed. March 20, 1984).
149/ Id.; see also note 112.
150/ Northern Pipeline, supra, at 2881 (Rehnquist, J.
concurring). See also Glidden Co. v. Zdanak, 370 U.S. 530,
536 (1962); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 411
(1973).
151/ Northern Pipeline, supra, at 2876, n. 31, see, e.g.,
Unt-ed States v. Raddatz, supra.
152/ Northern Pipeline at 2876, n. 31.
153/ Id. at 2882.
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(emphasis added). 154/ It is well settled that once a case
lies within the subject matter jurisdiction of a Federal
court, the parties may, with approval of the court waive
personal rights or consent to variation in the method of
litigation including referral of the case to a
non-article III bankruptcy judge. 155/
Permitting parties to consent to have State
lawsuits decided by a bankruptcy judge is based on the
magistrates model. 156/ Summarizing this analogy, one
proponent noted that "the U.S. magistrates system is partly
based upon consent . . ." and "since 1979 four circuit
courts of appeal have considered the constitutionality of
consent jurisdiction for magistrates and each of them has
upheld it." 157/ The conclusions of the Congressional
comments is that the bill's consensual reference provision
is constitutional.
In Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v.
Instromedix, Inc., 158/ the Ninth Circuit recently upheld
consensual reference of an entire case to a non-article III
adjunct. Reversing a panel decision, the court agreed with
the conclusion of the Third Circuit in Wharton-Thomas v.
United States, that consent of the parties under the Magis-
trates Act cures any constitutional defect. 159/ At issue
was the consent provisions of the Magistrates Act which
authorizes the non-article III adjuncts, when specially
designated by the district court, to exercise jurisdiction
154/ Id.
155/ See, e.g., Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America v.
Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984);
Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 992 (3d Cir.
1983); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1984);
Collins v. Forman, 729 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1984).
156/ 130 Cong. Rec., E1109 (daily ed. March 20, 1984).
157/ Id., see note 155.
158/ Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v.
Instromedix, 725 F.2d at 547 [hereinafter cited as
Pacemaker].
159/ Id. at 540.
over civil cases, provided the parties consent to the
reference. 160/ The challenge to the statute was based on
the implicit command of article III that judicial power of
the United States is confined to judges holding commissions
under and cloaked with the protections of that article. 161/
In rejecting this contention, the court noted that the Act
invests in the article III judiciary exclusive control, the
power to cancel a reference, and the power to designate
magistrate position and to select and remove individual
magistrates. 162/ The court concluded that this is suffi-
cient protectTn for the judiciary from encroachment of
other branches of government to satisfy the separation of
powers embodied in article III. 163/
B. Policy Considerations
The Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984 are styled as a
measure to improve the fairness and efficiency of bankruptcy
adjudication. 164/ The principal rationale of H.R. 5174 was
to "assist the district courts in cases, much like the
magistrates now help the district court handle criminal and
civil cases". 165/ It was estimated that the bankruptcyjudges would be able to enter final judgments in 95 percent
of the cases that do not require involvement by an arti-
cle III judge. 166/ In the remaining five percent of the
bankruptcy cases, the bankruptcy judge would enter a pro-
posed judgment. 167/ The district court, after reviewing
160/ Id. at 547.
161/ Id. at 540.
162/ Id. at 542-3.
163/ Id. at 547.
164/ 130 Cong. Rec. E1107-9 (daily ed. March 20, 1984);
compare 130 Cong. Rec. S8893 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
165/ 130 Cong. Rec. at E1108.
166/ Id.
167/ Id.
the record but hold a second hearing and promptly enter
final judgment. 168/
Proponents of the non-article III approach note
that the amendments do not offend any of the original
concerns that lead to the 1978 Reform Act. 169/ They note
that "the two evils of the jurisdictional provisions of
pre-1978 bankruptcy laws were numerous disputes as to
whether proceedings were properly in bankruptcy court or
State court, and delayed judgments in those matters that had
to be tried in State courts". 170/ The strategy of the
amendment is to provide for a single prompt forum for the
bulk of bankruptcy litigation. 171/ This is accomplished by
eliminating the "distinction between core bankruptcy matters
and those arising under State law . . . " 172/
In addition, it was anticipated that the measure
would add flexibility to the courts and to the litigants to
dispose of bankruptcy cases expeditiously. 173/ Ultimately,
this would lead to a decrease in the expense of bankruptcy
litigation and improve the quality of the judiciary. 174/
168/ Id.
169/ Id.
170/ Id.
171/ Id.
172/ Id.
173/ Id.
174/ Id.; Contrust, Justice Douglas comments:
Judges who sit on Article I courts are chosen for
administrative or allied skills, not for their
qualifications to sit in cases involving the vast interests
of life, liberty, or property for whose protection the Bill
of Rights and the other guarantees in the main body of the
Constitution, including the ban on bills of attainder and ex
post facto laws, were designed. Judges who might be
confirmed for an Article I court might never pass muster for
the onerous and life-or-death duties of Article III judges.
(Footnote Continued)
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Davis has observed that "although administrative
law comes from many sources, the principal lawmaker is and
will continue to be the Supreme Court." 175/ This is
certainly true for legislative and admin-t rative courts, as
well as article III courts. In 1978, Congress attempted to
solve a failing bankruptcy court system with a non-
article III structure. The Supreme Court in Northern
Pipeline found this solution unconstitutional. Congress wasprohibited from establishing under its article I powerslegislative courts to exercise jurisdiction over all matters
arising under bankruptcy law. Congressional response was to
redevise an article I scheme. Modeled after the Magistrates
Act, the scheme appears to meet all the Constitutional
objections of Northern Pipeline. Although this article I
scheme is similar in many respects to the original act, itdoes contain substantive changes. The article I "judge" is
an adjunct under closer supervision of the article III
court. Those non-core or matters not related to the bank-
ruptcy must be decided by the article III district court.
The parties to a bankruptcy proceeding could consent to abankruptcy judge's jurisdiction. Finally, the parties had a
right to a full "de novo" appeal to an article III court.
Thus, the impact of the Supreme Court's decision made the
Congress reconsider its procedural approach to bankruptcy
adjudication.
It should not be surprising that after 150 years,Congress still has Constitutional problems with some of its
statutory schemes. One scholar observed that "to differen-
tiate the judicial from the administrative by an analysis ofthe operation performed in carrying out the two functions is
as a general proposition a fatal task". 176/ Congress
wrestled with an article III and an artice I approach. In
closing the article I approach, Congress left open a door tofuture Constitutional challenges. The most obvious chal-lenge will be on the issue of mandatory abstention.
(Footnote Continued)
Glidden Co. v. Zdanak, supra, at 1502.
175/ Davis, supra, Preface.
176/ R. Brown, Administrative Commissions and the Judicial
Power, 19 Minn. L. Rev. 274 (1935).
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Permitting Federal court adjudication over State law claims
that could not otherwise be brought in Federal court will
generate future jurisdictional challenges. The lessons the
Bankruptcy Amendments offer is that article I and
article III courts will be able to function constitutionally
as long as that ultimate decision lies with the judicial
court. The Bankruptcy Amendments recognize the importance
of the bankruptcy judge as a complement to the article III
bench. The amendments embody many of the same concepts that
are contained in the Federal Magistrates Act. In this
sense, Congress has developed the correct solution to a
confusing area of Constitutional law.
From a platform in Hyde Park, at Speaker's Corner,
a left-wing agitator was haranguing the crowd on
the benefits to be derived from full-blooded
Socialism. "When the dawn of freedom comes," he
said, turning to a little man in a cloth cap on
the edge of the crowd, "you will be riding down
Park Lane in a Rolls-Royce car, with a top hat on
your head."
"Beg pardon, Guv," said the little man, "I
couldn't see meself in a top 'at. I'd rather
stick to me old titfer."
"Very well, then," said the orator. "When
the dawn of freedom comes, my friend, you will be
riding down Park Lane in a Rolls-Royce car,
wearing you own old titfer."
"Beg pardon, Guv," said the little man.
"Couldn't really see meself in a Rolls-Royce.
Think I'd be far better on me old bike."
"Look here," said the orator. "When the dawn
of freedom comes, you'll do what you're bloody
well told."
From Kindly Sit Down!, a compilation of after-dinner stories
told by members of parliament. The compilation was edited
and copyrighted by Jack Aspinwall, MP, and published by
Buchan & Enright, London (1983). The selection quoted above
was contributed by Percy Grieve, QC, MP, who, we suspect, is
a Tory member.
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